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A NEW LOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL REVISITED
J. L. Schellenberg
In this article I state concisely the central features of a new logical problem 
of evil developed elsewhere and take account of a response to this problem 
recently published in this journal by Jerome Gellman. I also reflect briefly on 
how theology can play a role in such philosophical discussions.
Jerome Gellman has in a recent issue of this journal responded1 to my 
attempt to produce a new logical problem of evil.2 Here I provide a basic 
explanation of the new problem and reply to Gellman’s main points, con-
cluding with some reflections on how theological commitments can affect 
one’s philosophizing about God and evil.
Modeling God
Many goods lauded by theists—a certain kind of free will is one—require 
there to be evil or require evil to be permitted. Admiration for such goods 
might conceivably lead someone to propose that the being of God prior 
to creation would have to include such goods and so could possibly, or 
would actually, include evil.3 But this is not the view of theists, who in-
stead regard the following proposition as a necessary truth:
Prior Purity (PP): Prior to creation there is no evil in God of any kind.
In other words, what theists hold is that it cannot be that, prior to creation, 
God is or does anything bad. In my proposed new logical problem of evil 
1See Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil.”
2See Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil.” This article developed two ap-
proaches to the problem, concerned with modeling God and with God’s motives in creation, 
respectively. Here, for economy and focus and also because Gellman gives it the larger share 
of his attention, carrying over much of what he says in this context to the other, I will restrict 
my attention to the first, modeling approach.
3“Prior” in “prior to creation” may be taken either logically or temporally.
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I sought to show that from PP in conjunction with two other propositions 
theists must regard as necessary truths, namely
Unsurpassable Greatness (UG): God is the greatest possible being
and
Ontological Independence (OI): No world created by God (or any part of 
a world) is a part of God,
it deductively follows that there is no evil in the world.4
I will not reproduce all the ins and outs of the reasoning; for these 
see the original article. But here are the main moves, together with some 
illustrative material not in that article. Call any good for which evil is 
required or must be permitted an evil-involving good. Assuming the 
three commitments of theism mentioned above, and extracting some of 
the content of a proposition that follows from the conjunction of UG and 
OI—(to a first approximation) that prior to creation all good is already 
contained in God—we can say this: Corresponding, prior to creation, to 
every possible evil-involving good g is a pure instance in God of a shared 
good-type T; this latter instance is the greatest possible instance of T, and 
greater than g (g could be, say, someone’s forgiveness of their daughter’s 
repentant killer, and T beauty).5 Likewise, created worlds without evil-in-
volving goods that more nearly approached the pure and unsurpassable 
greatness of God by richly modeling it would exceed in greatness worlds 
including evil-involving goods. It must be so, for the modeling worlds 
would come closer to the pure goodness of God, which as noted is always 
greater than any associated evil-involving good. Call such worlds Greater 
Worlds. Now God could ensure the existence of Greater Worlds and could 
do so limitlessly (some support for this idea appears in the remaining 
paragraphs of this section), facilitating for finite creatures an ever nearer 
approach to God’s goodness and doing so in numberless ways. So a reason 
to instead permit evil in a world could never arise for God: evil in a world 
might indeed appropriately be regarded by us as no less unthinkable than 
evil in God.
4“World” here normally refers to a reality ontologically distinct from God that depends 
or would depend for its existence on God’s creative activity, if God exists. “The” world (or 
“this” world or “our” world) is the world in which we live. To allow for flexibility in usage 
I will not say more than this, though it may be noted that, unless otherwise indicated, what 
I have in mind when using the term is distinct from the modal notion of possible worlds.
5Could the good in God be relevantly unsurpassable even if g were equally great? Must 
the former good be greater? One reason to think it must be is that no good of that type unreal-
izable in God could be as basic, as fundamental. If there could be a good not in God or able to 
be in God but quite outside God that was as basic, as fundamental, then, intuitively, we could 
no longer say (as we’ve seen theists must say) that all good is in God. Even if this is mistaken 
and g can be as great as the instancing in God of T, because of the modeling possibilities 
about to be introduced in the text we would still in the end be forced to admit that God has 
no reason to select g for instantiation rather than some one or other of—or some conjunction 
of—the modeling goods, new instances of which would, because of UG, be made available 
ceaselessly. 
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My notion of modeling here is to be taken broadly. It will be well to 
note, from the original piece, that a modeling good is “any good that 
purely resembles or images or mirrors or reflects a pure good in God,” 
and that “while every worldly good instances a higher goodness in God, 
the modeling goods need not be instances of the goods they model: the latter 
is but one way in which modeling can occur.”6 So although, say, finite 
love in a world created by God models divine love by being an instance of 
love, worldly modeling of divine love could occur in other ways—Greater 
Worlds could, for example, feature beings whose knowledge and experi-
ence of God’s love is ever more fully and richly realized. Such worlds too 
would exhibit a pure—and, if God wished it, a ceaselessly deepening—re-
flection of the higher good in God.
This ceaselessness is, as noted above, one aspect of the limitlessness 
mentioned where I say that God could ensure the existence of Greater 
Worlds limitlessly. And the other is the limitless number of Greater Worlds 
God could bring into existence. The key point here is that there is no end 
to the number of avenues leading to a pure knowledge and experience 
and embodiment of supreme value that an unsurpassably great and rich 
divine being can open up for finite beings. As I say in the original: “There 
can, to coin an expression, be new infinites of finite pure goodness in-
finitely, if their source is God and their task is to reflect the glory and 
richness of God.”7
It may be that to see the force of this new logical problem of evil, and in 
particular to feel adequately the weight here of PP, we will need to exercise 
our imaginations more than we ordinarily do. Mythical tales of heavens 
and hells as well as some regions of science fiction can help us in the quest 
to gain some small sense of how wonderfully rich would be the pure 
goodness—and also any opportunity to share in the pure goodness—of an 
unsurpassably great divine reality. If we understand by God the deepest, 
greatest, most fascinatingly rich personal being possible, there would for 
created beings always be new dimensions of God or of God’s creations or 
of God’s projects to get to know or to share. Certainly, we are most familiar 
with our own mode of being and the goods it enables us to encounter, and 
so we are naturally drawn to them, despite or even because of their often 
evil-involving nature. But if we want the truth instead of comfortable fa-
miliarity, we will have to admit that there would be no reason for God to 
be creatively biased in favour of us! We, of course, would prefer a world 
in which we exist, but our perspective now is one thing, and God’s before 
all creation quite another.
Having said that, some of the goods we do know of already compete 
quite well, when suitably enlarged, with evil-involving goods, and re-
flection on them may serve here as a kind of imagination pump. Think, 
for example, of the grandeur in Handel and Mozart and of the drama in 
6Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” 38. 
7Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” 40.
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Beethoven. And now imagine that a spiritual universe were designed to 
be like a glorious piece of music writ large, except with God as the Com-
poser, and that finite persons were given a taste for divine aesthetics or the 
ability to cultivate it, and able to traverse the wonders of this universe, or 
even with extreme exertion to enlarge upon it, forever or for a finite period 
of time. Why should we suppose that anything is missing here that only 
evil could supply?
Gellman’s Critique
So much for providing a sense of the new logical problem of evil. To re-
spond to it adequately, one would need to get fully acquainted with the 
original article, but the foregoing description will suffice as a basis for 
judging the force of Gellman’s response, to which I now turn. Gellman 
homes in on the question whether the new problem circumvents the free 
will defense. He thinks it at least dubious that it does (the numbering here 
reflects Gellman’s earlier summary of my reasoning): “Schellenberg wants 
his new logical problem of evil to not be vulnerable to the Free Will De-
fense offered by Alvin Plantinga. However, it is not at all obvious that this 
is so. Please note that
(8) God can ensure the existence of greater worlds, and can do so lim-
itlessly (where “greater worlds” contain only pure goods), is equiv-
alent to
(E) God can ensure the existence of any world in which there is no 
evil.”8
And Plantinga, according to Gellman, has shown that E is false. But the 
alleged equivalence here does not hold, and so Gellman’s critique is not 
off to a good start. Greater Worlds are by definition greater than and so 
distinct from “any world permitting or requiring evil,”9 which implies 
that they are distinct from worlds without evil in which there being no evil 
is due to creatures always freely doing good even when they were permitted to 
freely do evil instead. Thus even if God can ensure the existence of Greater 
Worlds limitlessly, it does not follow that God can ensure the existence 
of worlds in which there being no evil is due to creatures always freely 
doing good—and so it does not follow that God can ensure the existence 
of just any world in which there is no evil. Gellman’s equivalence claim is 
therefore false, and his suspicion that the free will defence can be applied 
to the new problem will need to find another basis.
There does not appear to be one in the rest of what he says about free 
will. Conceding that Greater Worlds, on my conception, must be free of 
evil-involving goods, and so seeing that more will be required to answer 
the new logical problem of evil, Gellman runs through various options 
8Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 442.
9Schellenberg, “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” 39.
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for libertarian freedom in a Greater World, concluding that only a “lim-
ited closed libertarian freedom” would be possible10—that is, a freedom 
to choose between good options but not between good and evil (closed), 
and a freedom to choose how one will move closer to God but never to fall 
away (limited):
So, let us assume that in a Schellenberg world people do not have morally 
significant freedom. If they are to have free will at all, they might still have 
what I will call “closed libertarian freedom,” by which I mean libertarian 
freedom to choose between good options, without freedom to choose evil. 
. . . [And] we must predicate limited closed libertarian freedom, by which I 
mean libertarian freedom to choose only among good alternatives, and lim-
ited to always striving to higher moral levels. Hence, when a person is faced 
with good choices that leave him at the same moral level as before, he will 
choose among them. When faced with choices where some, but not all, sig-
nify an advance to a higher moral level, the person will not be free to choose 
to stay at his present moral level, but will choose to advance. In choosing to 
advance, the person will be able to choose between good alternatives, each 
of which signifies moral advance. The person’s closed libertarian freedom 
will be limited in this way. If denizens of a Schellenberg world are to have 
freedom at all, it must be limited closed libertarian freedom.11
Closed libertarian freedom, Gellman admits, “fits very nicely with the 
modeling approach. . . . It is impossible for God to will evil, yet God does 
have free will to choose between alternatives involving no evil choices. So, 
we can think of God’s free will as the divine analogue of human closed 
libertarian freedom.”12 Limited closed libertarian freedom, however, “does 
not exist in God since God can never choose to advance morally. God is 
necessarily morally perfect.”13 Gellman rightly does not regard this as a 
serious obstacle for the modeling approach: “Yet, we can suppose that 
human closed libertarian freedom must be limited so that creatures can 
always be approaching God’s goodness by their own choice. This limita-
tion would be God’s concession for the sake of implementing the grand 
divine modeling plan. Limiting closed libertarian freedom for an infinite 
moral improvement would make for the closest mirroring of God’s infinite 
goodness.”14
So here Gellman is inclined to construe the modeling approach chari-
tably. But he’s still not buying it:
It seems that the Modeling Argument could avoid the Free Will Defense 
only by making such an assessment of the value of limited closed libertarian 
freedom. However, one might well reject this assessment, and think that 
the value of worldly good is at its most when chosen in open libertarian 
10Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 443.
11Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 443.
12Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 443–444.
13Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 444.
14Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 444.
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freedom. Then God would have had to allow significant moral freedom, and 
we would be back to the Modeling Argument’s vulnerability to the Free Will 
Defense. . . . Schellenberg’s argument depends on making a specific, contro-
versial judgment about the nature of worldly good.15
This is rather quick! By deriving my claims that bear on issues about free 
will from other more general propositions mentioned in my summary of 
the new problem above, I have indeed put out of reach such a response: 
now it is not a situation in which my specific intuition about the value 
of a certain kind of free will is pitted against the free will defender’s, but 
rather one in which my general judgments about purity, impurity, mod-
eling possibilities, and the absence of a reason for God to permit evil, given 
modeling possibilities, render the free will defender’s judgments inappli-
cable, or at least prevent them from being straightforwardly applied in the 
way Gellman imagines. Gellman’s response is a bit like a rubber band that 
suddenly snaps back to its original position. To get where he wants to go, 
Gellman needs to address those larger claims. The rubber band needs to 
stretch a little further.
Just as with his first move, Gellman appears to see that more is required 
of him to answer the new logical problem of evil, and so there is more for me 
to take into account. He spends some time developing a counterexample, 
involving the good of personal triumph, to the idea that all types of good 
are in God,16 which counterexample he thinks threatens the claim from 
the new problem that, above, I formulated as follows: “Corresponding, 
prior to creation, to every possible evil-involving good g is a pure instance 
in God of a shared good-type T; the latter instance is the greatest possible 
instance of T, and greater than g.” But while Gellman in this context has 
some insightful things to say about the kind of modeling of divine goods 
that includes instancing the types of goodness under which they fall, and 
also about the good of personal triumph, his counterexample does not ac-
tually threaten the claim in question. For in the original paper on the new 
problem I accept that not every type of good is realized in God. The claim 
under consideration (as expressed here and as it appears in the original) is 
indeed formulated so as to allow for that: suppose that g is the good of tri-
umphant mountain climbing; g must fall under some shared good-type T, 
some good-type God too instances, but there is nothing to prevent g from 
also falling under good types less general than T that are not instanced in 
God—here Gellman’s own example of “succeeding at a difficult task at 
which one could have failed and enjoying its fruits” will serve.17
Gellman considers an “imagined” rejoinder to what he has said which 
in effect concedes that this is so. In his way of putting it: even if the type of 
good we call personal triumph is not in God, perhaps all that’s required is 
15Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 444.
16Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 446–448.
17Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 449.
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that “God tokens the category (or categories) of good, call it C, applying 
to personal triumph in creatures.” He adds:
It is just that God tokens C in a different way, not requiring personal tri-
umph. C only has to be general enough to encompass both the human and 
the divine tokens. The fact that we might not be able to say quite what C is 
poses no real problem. After all, we have little grasp of the infinite nature 
of God and the way goods might inhere in God. In many respects, God is 
beyond our comprehension. So, from the fact that we might not be able to 
imagine a C common to both creatures and God, we ought not to conclude 
there is in God no such good, albeit in a form we cannot visualize.18
This is very much along the lines of what I said in the original piece; 
Gellman’s C is my T. Thus it seems to me well and good. So why does 
Gellman think it won’t do? Because of an error of interpretation. He ar-
gues that the claim under consideration (that corresponding, prior to 
creation, to every possible evil-involving good g is a pure instance in God 
of a shared good-type T, and that the latter instance is the greatest pos-
sible instance of T, and greater than g) still turns out to be false because 
the connection between the good of personal triumph and C could not be 
explanatorily tight enough—specifically, C does not lend itself to an expla-
nation of what is good about personal triumph—to warrant for the former 
the description “modeling C.”19 Evidently Gellman is assuming that, 
already at this first stage of my reasoning, in the claim (here) involving 
T, I am concerned with a connection between possible non-divine goods 
and goods instanced in God that amounts to the modeling of the latter by 
the former. But that is not the case. All the claim in question requires is 
that there be some pure type of goodness in God, however general, that 
is tokened by goods such as personal triumph and whose instancing in 
the divine case is also greater than them. Call the divine instance here “the 
higher good.” It is only later in the argument that the notion of modeling 
is introduced to emphasize how goods not at all like the good of personal 
triumph, goods that clearly do model the higher good in God, could fill a 
world that God brings into existence.
Thus even though Gellman is right in his claim that the good of personal 
triumph could not model any type of good in God, this causes no trouble 
for me, since the modeling argument does not require that it should be 
able to do so. Indeed, Gellman thereby helps me make one of the central 
points of that argument, which is that worlds and goods other than those 
permitting or requiring evil must be conceived if we want our thoughts to 
alight on goods modeling the pure good in God.
Theology and the Philosophical Imagination
I do not know if the new logical problem of evil is insoluble, lending itself 
to a real proof of the nonexistence of God, or at any rate insoluble without 
18Gellman, “On a New Logical Problem of Evil,” 448.
19Gellman, 449–450. See especially the middle of 449, where the word “modeling” is used.
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a major revision of theistic commitments. Until things have been shown to 
be otherwise, it is my position that this is so. I developed this problem in 
part because it seemed to me too easy, at present, to acquiesce in the no-
tion that “the” logical problem of evil had been solved—as if there could 
only ever be one, the one fine-tuned by Plantinga, which many assume he 
also solved.
It may seem that my position here is too cavalier, but it also owes some-
thing, and more fundamentally, to my serious sense that neither theism 
nor naturalism have as much going for them as their best-known advo-
cates suppose, and that we may be at a much earlier point in religious 
investigation than almost everyone supposes. Ideas about a divine reality 
deserve a measure of awe—perhaps “fear and trembling” would not be 
going too far—from finite humans so recently evolved. The deepest issues 
about ultimate realities and evil may not yet have been explored, and it is 
philosophy’s job to keep our nose to the grindstone.
Such an emphasis on intellectual humility in philosophy of religion—
indeed, any similar emphasis; provide your own—will be hard to live by 
if theology comes to bear on our philosophizing in the wrong way.20 So 
let me conclude by indicating how this can happen, and how it can pre-
vent arguments like the modeling argument from being taken seriously in 
quite the ways philosophy demands.
The main point is just that theology can arrest the philosophical imag-
ination. Theology begins from a commitment to the existence of God and 
so to the idea that this world, our world, has been created by God. If not 
treated carefully, it can therefore in philosophy lead to the assumption 
that our world is just the sort of world a God would create and to the 
shutting down of any enterprise aimed at a thorough and imaginatively 
free consideration of God’s options. The modeling argument, manifestly, 
needs that enterprise to stay open.
What we see here is a kind of constraint that can come to be placed on 
our thinking about the nature of God: the constraint imposed by the per-
haps unnoticed assumption that a correct understanding of God’s nature 
must cohere with the notion that God would actualize a world at least very 
similar to ours, right down to the inclusion of physical things and human 
beings. Call this the Similarity Constraint. Even many philosophers betray 
such an assumption; it is signaled when, for example, people mistakenly 
put into the very definition of “God” the idea that God is the creator of 
the universe, instead of, correctly, the creator of any universe there may 
be in a world actualized by God, or mistakenly say that God might be 
expected to be or do such-and-such for human beings instead of, correctly, 
for such creatures as there may be in a world actualized by God. Gellman 
20Notice that I’m not ruling out that there is a right way—or ways. For example, the 
various theistic theologies provide detailed pictures of the divine that certainly ought to 
be considered, along with other options, and may support positions of their own that are 
worthy of discussion in philosophy. I am advocating a garden in which many flowers are 
carefully tended, not the notion that all theological ideas must be cast out as weeds.
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too slips into the suggestion that God would create human beings.21 His 
label “limited closed libertarian freedom” likewise suggests the influence 
of the Similarity Constraint. Why not open liberating libertarian freedom?
Now, as I’ve suggested, the Similarity Constraint may not always be 
reflectively held. Indeed, I think its influence may often be one of which 
people are not conscious. Its influence is compatible with theistic phi-
losophers explicitly allowing, in various contexts, that God didn’t have 
to create anything at all, much less anything very similar to this world. 
I am not denying that this regularly occurs. Nevertheless, when people 
come to philosophy of religion as committed theists who (as such) accept 
the view that God would create a world like ours, this can drive their 
inquiry in ways that prevent them from noticing or giving due weight 
to various axiological possibilities that might count as evidence against 
their view. Arguments like the modeling argument offered by the new 
logical problem of evil, if not over-hastily dismissed, can provide a helpful 
countering influence, one that enables us to become conscious and clear 
about what’s going on here, and more fully opening us to the thought that 
God’s greatness might demand the creation of a very different world, if 
God creates at all. This thought, it seems to me, is one that the humility 
characteristic of good philosophy demands we take seriously.
The idea of God is different in this regard—far more interesting and 
majestic—than, say, the idea of Santa Claus, which is firmly anchored in 
the actual world (indeed tied to our planet and its human children). Phi-
losophers should be helping to bring this out. The Similarity Constraint 
ought to be far less influential in philosophy of religion than it is. Indeed, 
it ought explicitly to be rejected. Of course this doesn’t mean we should 
all accept atheism, though philosophers of religion who notice and con-
sciously set aside the Similarity Constraint may find that atheism appears 
in a different light. It does mean we should avoid slipping into an unjus-
tified assumption here, and into the constraint on the imagination that 
comes with it. Because of the influence of theology, it may sometimes be 
difficult to avoid doing so. But such an imaginative difficulty is precisely 
the sort of thing philosophers are committed to overcoming.
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